Messianic Fanaticism as a Factor Destabilizing Social Life in Poland
Outside of Judaism, Messianism— even the Messianism of Jesus — is hardly discussed at all. He is assigned the status of the Son of God, the Living God, and this is supposed to suffice for everyone. His divinity is treated as a certainty, just like the claim that there is only one Messiah — something that “everyone knows.” This conviction, however, is dogmatic in nature rather than cognitive.
It is an illusion to believe that anything other than God is singular. The assumption that the category of “uniqueness” can be uncritically transferred to historical, social, and religious phenomena is deeply problematic. This is especially evident given that the list of known historical Jewish Messiahs includes at least seven individuals. In Islam, at least ten Messiahs are described. Many others operated within other religious traditions. Among such a large group were great Masters, as well as mentally unstable individuals and various idolaters. This demonstrates that Messianism is a cultural and psychological phenomenon, not exclusively a theological one.
It is therefore worth listing some of the most well-known historical Messiahs, such as:
-Sabbatai Zevi, born in 1626 in Smyrna
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szabetaj_Cewi
-Baruchia Russo, born in 1676 in Salonika
http://www.jhi.pl/psj/Baruchja_%28Berachja%29_Ruso
-Interestingly, like Jesus, he was proclaimed a Messiah, and in later years not merely the Son of God, but God himself.
-Jacob Frank, born in 1726 in Korolówka in Podolia
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jakub_Frank
-Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, born in 1835
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirza_Gulam_Ahmad
-Mírzá ‘Alí Muhammad, born in 1819, known to history as the Báb
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%A1b
-Simon Bar Kokhba, died in 135 CE
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szymon_Bar-Kochba
This list is not evaluative in nature but classificatory — it points to the recurrence of the Messianic mechanism throughout history.
Below, in a short essay, I describe the Polish version of Messianic fanaticism that emerged in the 21st century.
- Introduction: Religion, Messianism, and Politics
Religion, as a sphere of meaning, transcendence, and ethics, in its mature form presupposes freedom of conscience, individual responsibility, and relationality — both toward God and toward other human beings. Christian Messianism, centered on the figure of Jesus Christ, originally carried a message of love, renunciation of violence, and opposition to domination based on force.
However, under modern conditions, religion and Messianism have been transformed into ideology — a tool of power, control, and social mobilization. The critical threshold is the transition from faith as a relationship to faith as a legitimation of power. Religious fanaticism and Messianic fanaticism thus emerge as systemic phenomena rather than merely individual ones.
- Religious and Messianic Fanaticism – The Nature of the Threat
Religious fanaticism consists in the absolutization of a single vision of God, truth, and moral order, combined with the rejection of interpretive pluralism and the right to alternative spiritual experience. Messianic fanaticism goes a step further: it identifies a specific community, nation, or political project with an alleged salvific plan, turning the Messiah into a symbol that legitimizes power and the exclusion of “others.” Anti-Messianic fanaticism, paradoxically, often reproduces the same logic of symbolic violence, replacing God with another absolute narrative — ideological or political. The difference lies in content, not in the structure of thinking.
In each of these variants, knowledge and faith become ideologized, and the relationship with God is replaced by a relationship of subordination. Spiritual language ceases to describe the experience of transcendence and instead begins to serve control, fear, and polarization.
An example from a few years ago was the attempt to introduce into the penal code automatic punishment for anyone who — in the implicit understanding of PiS politicians — would offend religious feelings. Such broadly defined “religious feelings” become a tool of repression rather than protection. The term is so expansive that one could theoretically face three years in prison for writing critically about a pedophile bishop.
- The Polish Context: Messianism and Power
In Poland after 1989, the Catholic religion occupied a privileged position in the public sphere. In recent years, a particularly close relationship has emerged between Church structures and political power exercised by the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). While holding executive and legislative power for three terms, this party consistently invoked Christian and Messianic symbolism, presenting itself as the defender of the only “truly Polish” faith, the nation, and tradition. In this narrative, religion ceases to be a space of conscience and becomes an element of party identity.
At the same time, public debate has repeatedly raised allegations concerning the systemic transfer of enormous public funds to Church institutions and entities personally and ideologically linked to the ruling camp. In this sense, Jesus Christ — as Messiah — was presented not as a figure of ethical critique of power, but as a symbol justifying it.
Such an understanding of Messianism does not lead to conversion or responsibility, but to the sacralization of political interest.
- Presidential Legitimation and Obstruction
This process was reinforced by the presidency of Andrzej Duda, who repeatedly supported the government’s narrative by signing constitutionally controversial laws and making symbolic gestures confirming the alliance between the state and the Church.
Currently, a similar obstructive role toward the government is played by Karol Nawrocki, who — in the eyes of critics — continues a confrontational logic, invoking language of moral superiority and threat from “others.” The mechanism remains the same: sacralization of one’s own position and demonization of the opponent.
- Social Consequences of Fanaticism
Religious, Messianic, and anti-Messianic fanaticism leads to dehumanization, stigmatization, and exclusion. The result is fear, deep polarization, and the breakdown of social bonds. It should be recalled that Poland is politically divided into nearly equal halves. Law and ethics cease to be spaces of cooperative work for the common good and become arenas of struggle for the dominance of a single “correct” narrative.
In this sense, the threat does not arise from Jesus himself nor from religion as such, but from their ideological appropriation and from a language that absolutizes and legitimizes violence. The PiS party simultaneously promotes Jesus while destroying the substance of his Messianism. The more symbols, the less ethics. The list of politicians’ and clergy’s behaviors reveals a collapse of coherence between declared values and public practice, undermining the credibility of the entire Messianic project.
The destruction of Jesus’ Messianism by PiS proceeds simultaneously with the promotion of Jesus and everything associated with the Catholic Church. In every city, monuments to priests are funded with public money, streets are named after them, and gigantic images of the Messiah are erected. One could extensively elaborate on individual politicians acting destructively against Jesus.
Several high-profile PiS politicians have fled the country to Hungary and Belarus.
Former minister Macierewicz drives across Poland at 233 km/h on expressways.
MP Matecki walks on the roof of parliament and periodically causes disturbances in various places.
For years, there has hardly been a week without a publicly revealed financial or political scandal involving PiS politicians — which hardly aligns with the Decalogue commandment “Thou shalt not steal.”
Polish priests, promoters of the Messiah, constitute a media pillar of pedophilia and homosexual scandals.
Independent MP Braun faces numerous criminal cases stemming from attacks on non-Messianic environments, including Jewish symbolism.
A party called Confederation is hostile to everything that does not promote or represent Messianism and Jesus.
Most prominent PiS politicians have at least a second wife or an official concubine.
- Language as a Space of Responsibility
A key element in sustaining fanaticism is language: narratives about enemies, betrayal, punishment, and purity. Language does not merely describe faith — it produces it. Changing the narrative is one of the fundamental tools for limiting fanaticism. This means returning to a language of relationship, responsibility, and uncertainty instead of a language of struggle and absolutes.
Recognizing Messianic fanaticism as a systemic phenomenon makes it possible to see the lack of sober judgment of reality and the consequences of one’s own choices among politicians and priests.
The concept of “scams in the name of the Messiah” is a sociological metaphor, as it describes a mechanism of cynical exploitation of the sacred for material and power-related goals — without faith, but with full awareness of manipulation.
Opublikowano: 08/01/2026
Autor: Sławomir Majda
Kateogrie: Jewish and other messiahs
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